APEX-Agents · Law
World423_JS_02
APEX-Agents task World423_JS_02 in AI Agents for Privacy and GDPR Compliance. Compare dual-harness agent runs across models — rubric criteria, scores, and public traces.
Task prompt
What the agent was asked to do
It has come to our attention that some of the data transferred by the "Diagnostics Analytics Module" related to residents of Colorado. Does Colorado Law require us to notify Colorado residents of this data transfer? Please respond to me here as a memo that outlines the requirements under the relevant laws and analyzes Northstar's situation in reference to the incident documentation.
Published trajectories
Agent runs on this task
Curated dual-harness runs (parsed + original sandbox). Best scored run per model.
| Model | Harness | Score | Result | Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5.5showcase | dual | 5/9 | Fail | Share pagePublic trace |
| fireworks models Kimi K2 | dual | 3/9 | Fail | Share pagePublic trace |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro | dual | 2/9 | Fail | Share pagePublic trace |
| GPT-5.4 | dual | 5/9 | Fail | Share pagePublic trace |
| GPT-5.4 mini | dual | 8/9 | Fail | Share pagePublic trace |
| GPT-5.4 nano | dual | 5/9 | Fail | Share pagePublic trace |
Grading rubric
Criteria and grader verdict (showcase run)
States that a disclosure of a security breach to affected Colorado residents is required unless a good faith investigation determines that a misuse of personal information is not reasonably likely to occur
PassEvidence: The memo states: “If a covered entity becomes aware a breach may have occurred, it must investigate misuse risk and notify affected Colorado residents unless the investigation determines that the misuse ... has not occurred and is not reasonably likely to occur.” Assessment: This directly satisfies the criterion that disclosure is required unless a good faith investigation determines misuse is not reasonably likely.
States that a security breach means the unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted computerized data that compromises the integrity of personal data maintained by a covered entity
PassEvidence: The memo defines a security breach as “the unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by a covered entity.” Assessment: This matches the criterion’s required statement about unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted computerized data compromising protected data maintained by a covered entity.
States that Northstar maintains personal information
FailEvidence: The memo says Colorado law applies to a covered entity that “maintains, owns, or licenses personal information,” but in applying the law it says the transferred data “does not appear to be Colorado statutory ‘personal information.’” Assessment: It does not clearly state that Northstar maintains personal information; it only describes the statutory rule generally and discusses the transferred metadata. Criterion not met.
States that Northstar is a covered entity
FailEvidence: The memo explains what obligations apply to “a covered entity” and includes a caveat: “If Northstar was acting only as a service provider/processor...” Assessment: The response does not affirmatively state that Northstar is a covered entity; it treats the role as conditional/uncertain. Criterion not met.
States that the "Diagnostics Analytics Module" transmitted metadata that did not include personally identifying information
PassEvidence: The memo states the module payload was “pseudonymous operational metadata” including UUID, timestamp, event type, device ID, etc., and “did not include names, email addresses... health data, or customer account numbers.” Assessment: This clearly states that the module transmitted metadata without personally identifying information. Criterion met.
States that there is no evidence that BlueQuill can identify any individual using the metadata it received from the "Diagnostics Analytics Module."
FailEvidence: The memo says BlueQuill “received only metadata” and “did not access, process, or enrich the metadata beyond automated log retention,” and that the data lacked names and other direct identifiers. Assessment: It does not clearly state that there is no evidence BlueQuill can identify any individual using the metadata it received. The required point about BlueQuill’s ability to identify individuals is not expressly made. Criterion not met.
States that the personal information maintained by Northstar was not compromised
FailEvidence: The memo concludes the transferred data was not statutory personal information and says “If later forensics show” enumerated categories were included, “the conclusion could change.” Assessment: It does not clearly state that personal information maintained by Northstar was not compromised; it focuses on the transferred payload not being statutory PI. Criterion not met.
States that transmission of the data by the "Diagnostics Analytics Module" did not constitute a security breach under Colorado law
PassEvidence: The memo states the incident appears to be “Not a Colorado breach-notification event” and that Colorado’s trigger “does not cover pseudonymous UUID/device metadata standing alone.” Assessment: This clearly states that the module’s transmission did not constitute a Colorado security-breach notification event. Criterion met.
States that Northstar is not required to notify affected Colorado residents of the data transferred by the "Diagnostics Analytics Module"
PassEvidence: The executive conclusion states: “Colorado law likely does not require Northstar to notify Colorado residents of this transfer at this time,” and the recommended position says Colorado law “does not require notice to Colorado residents.” Assessment: This directly satisfies the criterion. Criterion met.